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Nigel Farage has recently come under fire from an influential member from within his own party for his
authoritarian style of leadership. But research suggests successful right-wing populist parties often
have leaders with strong internal leadership qualities who exercise firm control over the party. In this
article, Fabio Wolkenstein looks at examples from across Europe, which may provide lessons for
UKIP.
In an interview with the Times last week, UKIP’s general election campaign director Patrick O’Flynn
strongly criticised party leader Nigel Farage for his authoritarian style of leadership. O’Flynn
complained that Farage’s leadership is making UKIP look like a “personality cult”, and called for a
more consultative and democratic form of leadership.
This internal row raises important questions about the future of UKIP as a relevant player in UK politics. Does the
party require internal reform to achieve electoral persistence? Need it become more internally democratic and less
top-down? The party’s disappointing election result proved to be a catalyst for debates on the necessity of
organisational change.
But perhaps UKIP’s problem is not that it is not “consultative and democratic” enough—but that its leadership is not
authoritarian enough. The European experience of populism explains why. Research suggests that right-wing
populist partiestend to be most successful when they are organised in a strict top-down fashion, with the leader
exercising firm control over the party.
The most extreme example is perhaps the Dutch PVV, where party leader Geert Wilders is the only member of the
party. Wilders not only accepts no party members. He usually handpicks and trains all his election candidates
himself, even accompanying them to debates to coach them and provide feedback on their performance. This
allows Wilders to enforce party discipline, since all his candidates are loyal to him. And it allows him to prevent
extremists, who are often attracted to parties like the PVV, to become candidates. The incentive to keep extremists
out is that they both tend to damage the party’s reputation in the electorate and undermine party unity.
Another emblematic example is the Austrian FPÖunder the leadership of Jörg Haider. During the party’s remarkable
rise in the 1990s, Haider exercised stern control over the party. Those who opposed Haider were either expelled or
have defected in the face of serious pressure, as did the party’s 1992 presidential candidate Heide Schmidt. When
Haider eventually stood down as party leader—ironically after a historic success in the 1999 elections—the party
faced a power vacuum at the top and internal conflicts broke loose, leading to the split of the party in 2005.
In short, successful right-wing populist parties often have leaders with strong internal leadership qualities. They
have leaders who safeguard the party from extremists, and keep candidates and personnel in line.
Farage succeeded at neither. He failed to keep party members in order (as the recent row shows), and he failed to
keep the extremists out, making the party a breeding ground for internal tensions—which might unravel now as the
party faces electoral defeat.
Perhaps one of UKIP’s big strategic mistakes was its rather open approach to the recruitment of candidates. In his
pre-election interview at BBC Newsnight, Farage described the party’s personnel policy as “meritocratic”, by which
is essentially meant that all those who want to devote themselves more to the party can in principle obtain senior
positions. While such a policy certainly carries the aura of democratic openness, it is a dangerous in a party that is
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prone to attract political adventurers, extremists, and opportunists. A lack of selectiveness can put party unity at risk.
Now, of course, one should be cautious with diagnoses that see UKIP as on the verge of disintegrating. But it seems
that the recent infighting is more than the party’s “blowing off steam” after the election, as Farage said towards the
end of last week. Indeed, O’Flynn’s public criticism of Farage is indicative of the enormous potential for internal
conflict within UKIP, a characteristic it shares with many parties of its kind.
One only needs to look to Germany’s anti-EU party AfD to find a potential scenario for UKIP’s future. Like UKIP, the
AfD adopted a relatively open personnel policy. As a result, several functionaries who oppose the leadership of
chairman Bernd Lucke have obtained senior positions in the party, and so gained the power to successfully mobilise
internal dissent. Now loyalty to Lucke is in decline, and even a party split is considered possible. The source of
instability within the AfD is, as one German commentator put it, that it mainly consists of people for whom “revolting
against political authority is the baseline of their political engagement”. The same could be said about UKIP.
Thus, UKIP’s future as an important actor in UK politics may depend on whether it could become less, rather than
more, organisationally democratic. This is the lesson to take from parties like the PVV and the early FPÖ, as well as
from “negative”cases like the AfD.
To be sure, strong, top-down leadership is not a magic bullet for the success of right-wing populist parties. Leaders
must themselves avoid to come across as incompetent or too extreme—Geert Wilders PVV suffered a disappointing
result at the European Parliament elections last year in part because he made a controversial statement about
Moroccan immigrants, for example. But it can eliminate some of the main sources of internal instability and help the
party present itself to the electorate as a unified agent.
O’Flynn’s sudden resignation from the party on Tuesday could be a first sign of Farage tightening controls and
getting to grips with discipline within the party. It could signal to potential dissenters the consequences of
questioning the leadership, and so ward off future efforts at undermining Farage’s authority—at least for the time
being.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog, nor of the
London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting. 
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